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1 
TROLLS OR GREAT INVENTORS: 
CASE STUDIES OF PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES 
RYAN T. HOLTE* 
ABSTRACT 
  There has been much debate about the economic harms caused by patent 
infringement lawsuits filed by patent holders who do not make or sell products 
covered by their own patents—entities pejoratively referred to as “patent 
trolls.” This debate has thus far been largely theoretical or based on broad 
industry-wide data. The purpose of this Article is to present a focused 
empirical report that has previously been lacking—detailed information 
regarding the inventors themselves, the patent assertion entities (PAEs) that 
represent them, and the stories behind their patents. The research for this 
Article centers on two instructive case studies: (1) MercExchange, L.L.C., the 
prominent PAE whose seminal patent infringement action against eBay 
continued to the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388 (2006); and (2) Capital Security Systems, Inc., a lesser-known PAE 
that has sued some of the largest banks in the world on its patented electronic 
check processing technology. This Article explores the stories behind the 
inventors, the patented inventions, and the entities asserting the patents in 
order to develop a more complete contextualized picture of PAEs and their 
economic impact. Based on this more complete picture, the Article then 
assesses whether these patent holders warrant the “patent troll” moniker, 
lurking under the bridge of innovation waiting to harass and extort innovators 
attempting to pass, or whether they instead resemble the great American vision 
of a Horatio Alger novel protagonist, laboring to build that bridge of 
innovation brick-by-brick and eventually reaping a reward for their hard effort. 
The Article concludes that, while additional studies are needed, the two PAEs 
studied herein fall squarely into the latter honest laborer category. 
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Edison Innovation Fellowship. For comments on earlier drafts, thank you to Anupam Chander, 
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Joshua Wright, and to the participants at the Washington University School of Law Junior 
Faculty Workshop, the 2014 IP Scholars Roundtable at Drake University Law School, and 
PatCon 4 at University of San Diego School of Law. Finally, many thanks to my wife Jessica for 
her support and comments and Nolan Sharkey for the excellent research assistance. All rights 
reserved © 2013 Ryan T. Holte. Comments welcome at rholte@law.siu.edu. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much ado has recently been made of patent infringement lawsuits filed by 
patent holders who do not practice the patents they own. These non-practicing 
patent holders are often referred to as “non-practicing entities” (NPEs), “patent 
assertion entities” (PAEs), or, more pejoratively, “patent trolls.”1 Regardless of 
name, the debate over these patent holders has regrettably been characterized 
more by contempt than praise.2 Further, little has been done to contextualize 
the debate by examining the particularized facts concerning the patent holders 
themselves, the stories behind their inventions, or the entities that represent 
their interests. 
The purpose of this Article is to provide some of the missing context. The 
research detailed here centers on two instructive PAEs, defining “PAEs” as a 
person or company who does not manufacture products or supply services 
related to patents it has rights to, but instead enforces the patent rights against 
accused infringers in an attempt to collect licensing fees.3 First, 
MercExchange, L.L.C., a notorious patent infringement PAE whose seminal 
action continued through full trial, a Federal Circuit appeal, and a decision by 
the United States Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.4 
Second, Capital Security Systems, Inc., a lesser-known PAE who has filed 
various patent infringement actions regarding electronic check processing 
technologies against the largest banks in the world with such actions generally 
ending in litigation settlements. These two PAEs were selected for case study 
in part because they both had a vast amount of records for independent review 
in building their history and because of the contrast between their respective 
litigation processes—MercExchange’s litigation against a limited number of 
defendants through trial and multiple appeals versus Capital Security Systems’ 
many lawsuits which generally result in quick settlement. The case studies 
extract the factual history of the inventor, invention, and entity creation that 
resulted in the patent assertions. Once those facts are drawn, analysis is made 
 
 1. To walk a middle line regarding terminology, this Article uses the descriptive term 
“Patent Assertion Entities” (or “PAEs”), as the focus concerns business entities that assert 
patents. The definition of PAE is different than the original definition advanced by Colleen 
Chien. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010) (“The most visible 
buyers of patents have been ‘patent-assertion entities,’ which I define as entities that use patents 
primarily to get licensing fees rather than to support the development or transfer of technology.”). 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. MercExchange is deemed “instructive” of a PAE, as it was described as having patent 
troll qualities by academics during briefing before the U.S. Supreme Court. Capital Security 
Systems, Inc. (CSS) is deemed “instructive” of a PAE as it is a company that does not sell any 
products and, among other things, is partnered for patent licensing with IPNav. For further 
discussion, see infra Part II.B. 
 4. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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to compare the researched PAE story with the “troll” issues and broad 
empirical data that has previously been put forth. Results are scrutinized to 
determine if this initial focused case study research supports a PAE story that 
is more “patent troll” or historically great American “Horatio Alger Inventor.”5 
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I reviews the current debate 
regarding PAEs, including current “troll” discussions, empirical research, and 
recently proposed patent law changes. Part II explains why case studies are 
vital in developing a more complete picture of the role PAEs play in the 
overall economy. Part III presents two instructive PAE case studies—
MercExchange and Capital Security Systems—and explores in detail the 
factual background behind the patented inventions, the inventors themselves, 
the PAEs who enforced the patents against the respective industry leaders, and 
the current state of the invention, inventor, and entity. Part IV attempts to 
separate fact from fiction, analyzing how well the actual PAE data comports 
with the currently popular PAE theories advanced by proponents and 
opponents alike. The Article concludes that, while additional case studies are 
needed, those presented herein depict PAEs as honest laborers working hard to 
build a bridge to innovation, more so than trolls sulking beneath the bridge 
impending innovation and harming the economy. 
I.  REVIEW OF THE CURRENT PAE DEBATE 
The debate around PAEs is most certainly the preeminent discussion in 
intellectual property law today. The New York Times and other newspapers 
have run innumerable articles on the actors,6 National Public Radio has 
 
 5. The descriptive term “Horatio Alger Inventor”—defined through a list of characteristics 
in Part I.D.—is based on the great American vision held by protagonist characters in novels 
written by 19th-century author Horatio Alger, Jr. The Alger subjects are most often characterized 
by rags-to-riches narratives, similar to Chris Cotropia’s “individual inventor motif” of a garage 
inventor wanting nothing more than to monetize his “Flash of Genius” invention. See Christopher 
A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
52, 54 (2009) (“The garage inventor is as American as apple pie. We enjoy stories of independent 
inventors, working against all odds to provide society with amazing technological breakthroughs. 
The stories are so entertaining that popular movies are made about such individuals—such as 
Flash of Genius, telling the story of Robert Kerns, the inventor of the intermittent windshield 
wiper system.”). See also Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal 
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2268 (1989) (“[Legal] narrative is 
truncated, simple and highly formalized. We can see this same phenomenon in the case of an 
American cultural narrative like the ‘Horatio Alger story.’ Once an extensive oeuvre of over forty 
very specific novels and short stories written by the nineteenth-century author Horatio Alger, the 
concept of an ‘Horatio Alger story’ has become a schematized ‘rags to riches’ folk model that is a 
cultural template with which to measure a wide variety of social data from conversational stories 
to legal concepts . . . .”). 
 6. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, House Bill Raises Bar for Suits Over Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
6, 2013, at B4; Brad Feld, A Bipartisan Plan to Clean Up the Patent Mess, WALL ST. J (Nov. 14, 
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featured multiple stories on the debate,7 and companies, legal scholars, and 
economists around the world have written countless “troll” discussion pieces, 
and commissioned just as many empirical studies, on the issues involved.8 
Regarding changes within government, the debate appears to be at a climax: 
the new Chairwoman of the Federal Trade Commission has made PAEs her 
top priority;9 President Obama has repeatedly urged Congress to enact new 
legislation,10 even mentioning patent reform during his 2014 State of the Union 
Address;11 and on December 5, 2013, the House of Representatives passed the 
Innovation Act by a vote of 325 to 91 to “take[ ] meaningful steps to address 
the abusive practices that have damaged our patent system and resulted in 
significant economic harm to our nation.”12 Even state attorneys general have 
begun using state consumer protection laws to attack PAEs.13 Beyond 
 
2013, 6:56 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023037638045791844440 
20604378. 
 7. When Patents Attack, NPR (July 22, 2011, 8:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/ 
2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents-attack; When Patents Attack. . .Part Two!, NPR (June 4, 
2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/06/ 07/188370495/when-patents-attack-
part-two. 
 8. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 9. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Computer and 
Communications Industry Association and American Antitrust Institute Program: Competition 
Law & Patent Assertion Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do 12 (June 20, 2013) (transcript 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/competition-law-
patent-assertion-entities-what-antitrust-enforcers-can-do/130620paespeech.pdf) (“The 
Commission can contribute to a broad policy response to PAEs by using its Section 6(b) authority 
to collect more comprehensive information on the variety of PAE business models and the scope 
of their activities. Antitrust and consumer protection enforcement, where warranted, can also have 
important roles to play in reducing the harm associated with certain PAE conduct. But patent 
reform and efforts by both the PTO and the courts, are critical to any effort to move the consumer 
welfare dial on PAEs from cost to benefit.”). 
 10. Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root Out ‘Patent Trolls,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 
5, 2013, at B1 (noting that President Obama announced several executive orders “to protect 
innovators from frivolous litigation” by patent trolls); Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to 
Protect American Innovation, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.white 
house.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-protect-american-innovation (President Obama 
stated that patent trolls “don’t actually produce anything themselves. They’re just trying to 
essentially leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some money out of 
them.”). 
 11. Diane Bartz, Obama Urges Congress to Pass Anti-Patent Troll Bill, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 
2014, 9:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/29/us-usa-obama-patent-idUSBREA0S 
07V20140129. 
 12. Diane Bartz, House Passes Tech Backed Bill to Rein in ‘Patent Trolls,’ REUTERS (Dec. 
5, 2013, 3:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/05/us-patents-congress-idUSBRE9B 
40Y820131205 (quoting Congressman Robert Goodlatte). 
 13. Pamela M. Prah, State AGs Target Patent Trolls to Protect Business, USA TODAY (Nov. 
25, 2013, 9:29 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/25/state-ag-patent-
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discussion points and studies, however, there is no denying current PAE 
litigation has an impact on the economy and invention generally.14 
For the purposes of this Article, and its case study analysis focus, this Part 
will survey the PAE literature available to extract discussion themes that are 
useful for comparison to the factual case studies later presented.15 The current 
PAE discussion will be broken into three sections: the “troll” debate, empirical 
points, and focused changes in patent laws regarding PAEs. Each of the 
sections will focus on discussion regarding the inventions and entities within a 
PAE classification, as opposed to a broad multi-party problem that could not 
be addressed within an individual-entity case study. This review and 
accompanying discussion is not intended to be comprehensive. Like the limited 
case study focus, it is merely representative of an initial building block upon 
which further research can be tailored. 
A. The Two Sides of the “Troll” Debate 
1. One Side of the “Troll” Debate: PAEs Are a Plague on the Patent 
System 
Perhaps the best place to begin a review of the “troll” discussion is with 
the now commonplace term “patent troll.”16 In early deliberations regarding 
 
trolls/3696889/ (“A handful of attorneys general this year began using state consumer laws to 
combat trolling, a strategy pioneered by Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell . . . .”). 
 14. Ronald Bailey, Patent Trolls or Tech Fairy Godmothers?, REASON.COM (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://reason.com/archives/2012/01/24/patent-trolls-or-tech-fairy-godmothers. See also James 
Bessen et al., The Private and Social Cost of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, Winter 2011–12, at 26, 
26 (“We find that NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to 
defendants from 1990 through 2010. During the last four years, the lost wealth has averaged over 
$80 billion per year. These defendants are mostly technology companies that invest heavily in 
R&D. . . . That is, these lawsuits substantially reduce their incentives to innovate.”); Robin 
Feldman & Thomas Ewing, The Giants Among Us, STAN. TECH. L. REV., Jan. 9, 2012, at 1, 5 
n.22, available at https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-
review-stlr/online/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf (“The size of Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio can 
also be estimated based upon how much the company has spent acquiring this portfolio and how 
much they have spent per patent. . . . Intellectual Ventures had spent $1.163 billion acquiring 
patents by May, 2009. In a study of Ocean Tomo patent auctions, we concluded that Intellectual 
Ventures had spent a little more than $61 million acquiring 410 US patents . . . at an average cost 
of $148,966 per US patent obtained.”). 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. Of interesting note is that the term “patent troll” was first coined in 2001 by Peter 
Detkin, former in-house counsel for Intel Corporation, while describing a set of small companies 
suing Intel for patent infringement. Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for 
Dollars, THE RECORDER (July 30, 2001), http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf. See also 
Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 50, 53. Mr. Detkin’s current position is 
founder and vice-chairman of the patent aggregator Intellectual Ventures. See Leadership, 
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the term’s definitions, potential descriptors have used it to refer to: “somebody 
who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and 
have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced”;17 “an entity 
that owns a single patent or a small group of patents and essentially is looking 
for nuisance-value settlements”;18 “[a]nybody who tries to enforce a patent in 
an area where they are not actively competing with a product or process”;19 or 
“anyone who threatens litigation on dubious patents.”20 Through further debate 
and research, the scholarship has grown to understand that there are different 
types of PAEs in the marketplace.21 However, all descriptors do seem to come 
with a negative undertone. 
In summarizing the “troll” debates, broad themes do seem to emerge—
PAEs force commercializing companies to pay for patent infringement 
damages or to purchase a patent license without adding any value to society 
themselves.22 Robert Merges has stated that the “true distinction . . . concerns 
the difference between patentees who make real contributions to innovation 
and those who do not.”23 In a brief Merges et al. prepared for the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the case of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.—the case study 
discussed infra—Merges et al. advocated on behalf of amicus curiae Yahoo! 
 
INTELL. VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/about/leadership (last visited Oct. 9, 
2014). 
 17. Sandburg, supra note 16 (“Detkin spends much of his time these days fighting off claims 
of patent infringement by companies that have never made a semiconductor device. In 1999 
alone, the claims topped $15 billion, Detkin said, and he hurls the epithet ‘patent trolls’ at the 
companies that want Intel to pay up. He even keeps a couple of troll dolls on his desk in the gray 
warren of buildings at Intel’s Santa Clara headquarters just as a reminder of his company’s legal 
enemies.”). 
 18. Seidenberg, supra note 16. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-
Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 tbl.1 (2009) (listing a dozen entity status categories 
including the following: Entity Class 1 (acquired patents); Entity Class 2 (university heritage or 
tie); Entity Class 3 (failed startup); Entity Class 4 (corporate heritage); Entity Class 5 (individual-
inventor-started company); Entity Class 6 (university/government/NGO); Entity Class 7 (startup, 
pre-product); Entity Class 8 (product company); Entity Class 9 (individual); Entity Class 10 
(undetermined); Entity Class 11 (industry consortium); and Entity Class 12 (IP subsidiary of 
product company)). 
 22. James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 421 (2014) (“Large numbers of expensive lawsuits by NPEs impose 
substantial costs on society regardless of whether the patents involved are valid or not.”). 
 23. Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law 
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1587, 1599–1600 (2009) (“Many patent assertion 
companies do not perform research and development as those terms are commonly understood. 
They do not participate in the growth of knowledge and technology. True trolls do not really 
innovate at all. . . . And this stark fact explains succinctly why the market for true troll activity is 
not worth defending. It is a market for a product that has no social value at all.”). 
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Inc. that “entities that have engaged in strategic ‘troll-like’ behavior should not 
be entitled to injunctions.”24 Specifically, problems with PAEs were 
summarized as: 
 “[PAEs] do not innovate, but rather seek to acquire broad and nebulous 
patent claims that arguably encompass existing technologies . . . .”25 
 “[PAEs] in the computer and Internet industry . . . . [result in] a ‘patent 
thicket’: ‘a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a 
company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new 
technology.’”26 
 “[PAEs] manipulate [Patent Office] processes to delay patent issuance and 
thereby set a ‘trap’ for claimed infringement . . . . [or] delay invoking the 
patent, knowing that the value of the infringing use to the infringer will 
increase during the delay.”27 
In a more recent article discussing PAE growth, increasing costs of patent 
litigation, and seemingly excessive damages awards, Mark Lemley and Doug 
Melamed summarize three distinct business models for PAEs: (1) “a company 
that owns a patent and hopes to strike it big in court”; (2) those “interested in 
quick, low-value settlements for a variety of patents”; and (3) those “engaged 
in the business of patent aggregation[,] . . . . collect[ing] many patents—
sometimes tens of thousands[—to] demand royalties to license the portfolio 
 
 24. Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange 
L.L.C., 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 1003 (2006). The argument against MercExchange 
receiving an injunction was differentiated from “legitimate companies” as follows: “the Federal 
Circuit has carefully interpreted Section 284, which authorizes damages, to ensure that patent 
holders receive relief that is proportionate to the contribution of their invention to the overall 
economic value of the end product. . . . At the same time, the courts should continue to award 
injunctions to legitimate companies producing socially valuable products to continue to 
encourage innovation consistent with the underlying principles of patent law.” Id. at 1014–15. 
 25. Id. at 1004–05 (“The enormous complexity of the computer and Internet sector has, 
however, given rise to a ‘new breed of entrepreneurs’ known as ‘patent trolls.’ These entities do 
not innovate, but rather seek to acquire broad and nebulous patent claims that arguably 
encompass existing technologies relied on by companies with deep pockets. By acquiring these 
claims and threatening or pursuing litigation, the patent trolls seek and often receive economic 
settlements from genuine innovators and producers that greatly exceed the true economic value of 
the patents in question.”). 
 26. Id. at 1005 (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120–21 (Adam 
Jaffee et al. eds., 2001)). The authors continue: “To compound the problem, no computer or 
Internet company can be confident that its product will not ultimately be found by a court to 
infringe existing patents, even if it engages in an extensive patent search that may substantially 
delay release of a product and cost millions of dollars.” Id. at 1107. 
 27. Id. at 1002. 
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and threaten to sue those that do not pay.”28 Lemley and Melamed agree with 
others that “there is little evidence that [PAEs] significantly increase rewards 
to inventors”29 and find support for similar theories as those advanced by 
Merges et al.: 
 PAEs result in “‘royalty stacking’—the cumulative burden of the royalty 
obligations resulting from the large number of patents on technologies used 
in IT products.”30 
 PAEs “aggregate too many patents.”31 
 Litigating against PAEs “is more costly than dealing with practicing entities 
. . . . [PAEs] are more willing to prolong and broaden patent litigation.”32 
 PAEs are more inclined “to defer licensing discussions until technology 
users have developed and invested in products that include the patented 
technologies and are thus less able to switch to alternatives.”33 
While Lemley and Melamed conclude that patent assertions by practicing 
entities create problems just as costly as those created by PAEs, the recent 
review of problems commonly associated with PAEs provides a partial 
necessary starting point for the analysis here. 
 
 28. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2117, 2126–27 (2013). It is important to note that this Article concludes that many of the 
complaints regarding PAEs as the source of problems with the patent system have little 
substance. 
 29. Id. at 2125, 2129 (“[T]rolls engage more frequently than practicing entities in conduct 
that increases the costs of technology users while providing little if any countervailing benefit.”). 
For a counter argument to Lemley and Melamed’s conclusions and a discussion of the benefits 
patent mass aggregators may provide, see David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51 (2014), available at http://www.columbialawreview.org/On-mass-
patent-aggregators_Schwartz. 
 30. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 28, at 2148. 
 31. Id. at 2153. While Lemley and Melamed do support a conclusion that PAEs aggregate 
too many patents, to the extent that PAEs aggregate large numbers of patents, they conclude that 
the aggregation likely reduces the costs to technology users. Id. at 2167 (“The advent of trolls has 
probably led to the monetization of patents that would otherwise have been ignored, but it is not 
clear that that is a bad thing as a matter of public policy or that the broadening of the secondary 
market for patents that trolls have stimulated will remain unique to trolls in the future.”). 
 32. Id. at 2161–62. Regarding litigation, Lemley and Melamed also conclude that litigation 
is generally much less costly for PAEs than practicing entities “because [PAEs] have less 
complex business operations—and thus fewer witnesses and far fewer documents—to produce in 
discovery.” Id. at 2162. But see id. at 2176 (“[H]igh costs and uncertainty of litigation encourages 
bottom-feeder suits aimed at [quick] settlement rather than at winning.”). 
 33. Id. at 2165. 
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2. The Other Side of the “Troll” Debate: PAEs Can Be a Positive Part of 
the Patent System 
While the overwhelming amount of PAE literature is negative, a few 
commentators have noted positive attributes. In his recent book The Falcon’s 
Gyre: Legal Foundations of Economic Innovation and Growth, professor of 
law and economics, Robert Cooter, explains: 
Innovating, marketing, and enforcing are different specialties . . . . By 
prosecuting infringers who use an invention to produce consumer goods, 
[PAEs] transfer resources from consuming to innovating, which speeds 
progress in the useful arts. To increase progress in the useful arts, law should 
facilitate sales of patent rights to [PAEs] for innovations used in consumption 
or production.34 
In short, Cooter finds the specialty that PAEs provide in transferring resources 
from consuming/consumers to innovating/inventors a necessary value in the 
patent system—different people and firms have comparative advantage in 
different activities.35 
Following on Cooter’s analysis, Michael Risch argues that PAEs may play 
a key middleman role in the patent system by purchasing patents from non-
employed, non-practicing individual inventors and supporting the “ethos” of 
the individual inventor.36 This “ethos” has been described by Christopher 
Cotropia “as American as apple pie.”37 Risch goes on to argue that PAEs 
accumulating patents into portfolios treated like securities would (1) subject 
them to new regulatory framework to improve market integrity, and (2) 
“encourage the formation of transparent market clearinghouses and 
development of methods for determining pricing.”38 
While discussing the intent of the 1952 Patent Act and historically 
reviewing patent entities, Scott Kieff, former professor and current 
commissioner of the International Trade Commission, raises another useful 
point applicable to current PAEs: patents, and the ability to own and assert 
 
 34. ROBERT COOTER WITH AARON EDLIN, THE FALCON’S GYRE: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC INNOVATION AND GROWTH 6.23–6.24 (1.4 ed. 2014). 
 35. Id. See also Timothy Holbrook, Not All Patent Trolls Are Demons, CNN.COM (Feb. 21, 
2014, 9:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/opinion/holbrook-patent-trolls-demons (“What 
is lost in this mudslinging is that much of what PAEs do is laudable—paying inventors. Patents 
don’t grow on trees. Someone came up with the invention and incurred considerable expense to 
obtain the patent. Many inventors can’t bring their invention to market themselves, however, so 
selling the patent may be the only way for them to make money. By buying these patents, PAEs 
compensate inventors, one of patent law’s objectives.”). 
 36. Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 98 (2013). See also 
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 61–63 (discussing the role of patent aggregators in returning profits to 
individual inventors). 
 37. Cotropia, supra note 5. 
 38. Risch, supra note 36, at 95–96. 
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patents as property rights regardless of the status of the owner, “provide an 
incentive to invest risk capital for commercialization[,] . . . considered to be 
‘usually the most expensive part of the long haul from the mental conception 
of the invention to the delivery of something useful into the hands of the 
consumer.’”39 Taking that notion a step further, some commentators have 
argued that the business of PAEs, separate from individual inventors, is already 
spawning innovation through small and large companies alike by way of 
promoting invention through licensing dollars.40 The sum of these ideas is that 
individual inventors are being encouraged to invent through economic return 
from patent licensing allowed by PAEs. 
B. The Two Sides of the Empirical Debate 
1. One Side of the Empirical Debate: PAEs are a Problem for the Patent 
System 
Many recent empirical studies have reviewed PAE impact broadly. 
Perhaps most controversial is the James Bessen and Michael Meurer study 
entitled The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes.41 That study found PAEs cost 
society $29 billion annually.42 A comprehensive discussion of this study has 
 
 39. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 743 (2001) (citing Giles S. Rich, Patents Are Bait 11 (1945) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with Scott Kieff)). Rich was the co-author of the 1952 Patent Act. See also 
Eriq Gardner, The Best Intentions, IP LAW & BUS., March 2006 (“Venture capitalists won’t even 
fund new businesses without an assurance they can keep competitors out of the marketplace.”). 
 40. Bryan P. Lord, Evolution of the Technology Firm: IP Rights and the Business of 
Licensing, in FROM ASSETS TO PROFITS: COMPETING FOR IP VALUE AND RETURN 19, 33–36 
(Bruce Berman ed., 2009) (discussing the growth of technology through an IP licensing model). 
See also James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the 
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190, 209–11 (2006) 
(“Patent trolls actually benefit society. These trolls act as a market intermediary in the patent 
market. Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent 
markets . . . .”). Indeed, often times practicing entities also choose to monetize patents they do not 
practice, behavior very similar to entities in a licensing-only business. 
 41. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 22, at 388–89 (2014) (“The costs disclosed by this [study] 
are significant and should play a prominent role in policy debates about the treatment of NPE 
patent lawsuits.”). See also David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-
Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 455 (2014) (“With respect to 
the debate about NPEs, we believe that focusing on costs and transfers from NPEs are somewhat 
beside the point. The bigger picture, and the better question, is whether the lawsuits are being 
brought because the defendants are infringers of a valid patent or whether the defendants are 
merely easy targets for a nuisance lawsuit.”). 
 42. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 22, at 389. A previous study found that PAEs have cost a 
total of $500 billion over the past twenty years. See Bessen et al., supra note 14. 
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continued—with published response43—and does not need to be replicated 
here; however, of key interest to this Article is the finding that: 
[A]bout 70% of the payments that defendants make go to the legal costs of 
both parties or to operating costs of the [PAEs]. . . . [M]ost of the money that 
defendants pay does not represent a transfer to inventors; instead, it is largely 
consumed by legal and operating costs.44 
Regarding a distinguishing of certain valuable PAEs in the study, Bessen and 
Meurer conclude that certain PAEs that “administer patent pools” or “facilitate 
technology transfer [or] outsourcing of R&D” are likely desirable, but 
“standard economic-welfare analysis implies that patent litigation even over 
valid patents can be socially harmful.”45 
Other studies directly addressing the targets of PAEs have concluded that 
PAEs disproportionately focus lawsuits on startups and small companies. 
Colleen Chien’s 2014 study Startups and Patent Trolls found that “small 
companies are vulnerable targets” for three fundamental reasons: they are 
more likely to pay nuisance settlements regardless of the merits of a lawsuit; 
they are regular users of technology; and they increase the returns to PAEs 
through lawsuit settlement-validation of PAE patents, regardless of their 
validity.46 In a 2013 New America Foundation study, Chien further concluded 
that PAEs have a large impact on startup companies and that, according to 
survey respondents, any “benefits do not appear to offset the harms.”47 
Finally, in a 2011 study by John Allison et al. descriptively titled Patent 
Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, the authors reviewed 
patent litigation results of the 343 most-litigated patents.48 The results of the 
study included that “the most-litigated patents that go to judgment are far more 
likely to be held invalid or not infringed[;] . . . [o]nce-litigated patents win in 
court almost 50% of the time, while the most-litigated—and putatively most 
 
 43. Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 41, at 428. 
 44. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 22, at 417. These conclusions have been questioned 
through further analysis of the research data set. Among other things, the Bessen and Meurer 
licensing revenue data was from only ten publicly traded companies. See Schwartz & Kesan, 
supra note 41, at 433. 
 45. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 22, at 420–21. 
 46. Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 485–86 
(2014), available at https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-
review/online/startupsandpatenttrolls.pdf. 
 47. Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, NEW AM. FOUND. 1, 4 (Sep. 
2013), http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/PatentAssertionandStartupIn 
novation_updated.pdf. 
 48. John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 
GEO. L.J. 677, 683 (2011). 
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valuable—patents win in court only 10.7% of the time.”49 Allison et al. offer 
preliminary thoughts regarding explanations for the results: 
 “[D]efendants rather than plaintiffs are driving the decision to take a weak 
patent to judgment by simply refusing to settle.”50 
 “[T]he enforcement of a patent against multiple infringers is an indication of 
widespread simultaneous invention and, hence, of obviousness.”51 
 “[T]he economics of patent litigation make it profitable to enforce . . . 
patents that are overwhelmingly likely to lose in court.”52 
The authors admit that “[n]one of these explanations [are] entirely 
satisfactory,” but they conclude that “as a society, we are spending a 
disproportionate amount of time and money dealing with a class of weak 
patents.”53 
2. The Other Side of the Empirical Debate: PAEs Can Be Good for the 
Patent System 
In addition to theoretical pieces regarding PAEs, Michael Risch has further 
conducted empirical studies of PAEs in comparison to other types of patent 
litigants. In a 2012 study regarding the top ten most litigious PAEs entitled 
Patent Troll Myths, Risch concludes that a PAE bringing a lawsuit was very 
 
 49. Id. at 680 (“[C]ases involving the most-litigated patents are indeed more likely to settle 
than ordinary-litigated patents with a high degree of significance. But to our great surprise, we 
find that the willingness of these patentees to litigate their cases to judgment is a mistake. . . . 
[T]he most-litigated patents that go to judgment are far more likely to be held invalid or not 
infringed.”). 
 50. Id. at 681 (“We first investigate whether the outcome data are the result of clustering—a 
few cases in multidistrict litigation that invalidate or hold not infringed multiple patents at once. 
We find some evidence of clustering but not enough to explain the full differences in the 
outcomes. One possible explanation is that defendants rather than plaintiffs are driving the 
decision to take a weak patent to judgment by simply refusing to settle.”). 
 51. Id. at 679, 681 (“If you are a patent owner who faces multiple infringers, the deck is 
stacked against you. . . . One possible option is to sue all the defendants at once. Doing so makes 
the resulting case more complex, but it insulates the patentee from the risk of having to litigate 
validity again and again.”). 
 52. Id. (“Alternatively, patentees that are involved (or expect to be involved) in multiple 
lawsuits might reasonably be more likely to settle cases rather than risk taking them to judgment 
because an adverse judgment wipes out all the other lawsuits as well.”). 
 53. Allison et al., supra note 48, at 681. The authors go on to state: 
Nonpracticing entities and software patentees almost never win their cases. That may be a 
good thing, if you believe that most software patents are bad or that NPEs are bad for 
society. But it certainly means that the patent system is wasting more of its time than 
expected dealing with weak patents. And it also suggests that both our measures of patent 
value and our theories of litigation behavior need some serious reconsideration. 
Id. at 712. 
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likely to be the same entity that filed the patent application initially.54 Risch 
further opines that individuals face a “significant disadvantage in high-stakes 
patent litigation unless they allow [PAEs] to enforce their patents.”55 In his 
study, Risch determined the following six common assertions regarding PAEs 
were “myths”: 
 Litigious PAEs are a recent phenomenon. 
 PAE patents are business method patents.56 
 PAE patents and infringement claims are low quality. 
 PAE patents come from nonproductive endeavors. 
 PAEs obtain their patents from fire sales.57 
 PAEs wait for the industry to develop to file suit.58 
Risch states that “believers in individual inventing will favor [PAEs] because 
they provide a remedy to such inventors.”59 
Other authors have come to conclusions comparable to Risch’s when 
conducting similar empirical studies regarding patenting and litigation 
behavior of non-practicing PAEs.60 Those conclusions include the following: 
PAEs “own patents that are of significantly higher value or importance than 
other litigated patents”; PAE patents “rank higher than the litigated patents that 
share the same technological class in every value measure employed”; and “the 
 
 54. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458, 470–72, 498–99 
(2012) (“[The research reviews] [t]he top ten NPE . . . involved in 971 unique litigations. These 
litigations involved 347 patents. In turn, the 347 patents resulted from 208 initial patent 
applications, many of which spawned multiple patents.”). 
 55. Id. at 494, 498 (“A . . . justification of NPEs is that they provide better opportunities for 
individual inventors to enforce their patents. There are two reasons NPEs might do so. First, they 
may provide cost, money, and other resources to continue litigation in cases when contingent-fee 
lawyers may not provide such resources. Second, they may provide better credibility for 
settlement purposes. Each of these reasons explains why NPEs might serve the needs of 
individuals in ways unnecessary for small companies.”). 
 56. Business method patents generally relate to a method of doing business regarding 
automated businesses and e-commerce. 
 57. A fire sale is a sale of goods at extremely discounted below-market prices. 
 58. Risch, supra note 54, at 497–99. Risch goes on to conclude that PAEs may be the best 
option for smaller inventors: “Individuals may face a significant disadvantage in high-stakes 
patent litigation unless they allow NPEs to enforce their patents. This means that NPE litigation 
may be the best way for garage inventors to capitalize on their patents if infringers refuse to 
license.” Id. at 498. 
 59. Id. at 499 (“[O]ne’s beliefs about individual inventors should inform one’s beliefs about 
NPEs. Strong believers in individual inventing will favor NPEs because they provide a remedy to 
such inventors. On the other hand, those who believe individual inventors contribute little to 
innovation and growth will not favor NPEs.”). 
 60. Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing 
Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 117–18 (2010). 
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success rate of [PAEs] in patent infringement litigation is quite similar to that 
of other litigants.”61 
Beyond current empirical research, some authors have studied historical 
cases regarding inventors and patent litigants. In his 1995 article discussing the 
history of medical-procedure patenting, Dr. William Noonan reviewed the 
history of Charles Goodyear, the 1839 inventor of vulcanized rubber, who filed 
multiple lawsuits against individual end-user dentists in furtherance of 
monetizing his invention through licensing.62 In similar fashion—discussed by 
Adam Mossoff in a recent article regarding the sewing machine wars of the 
1850s—Elias Howe, the inventor of the lockstitch, made royalty demands 
through suing patent-infringing retailers and manufacturers, even threatening 
liability for all purchasers of unlicensed sewing machines.63 Finally, in her 
2005 book, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in 
American Economic Development, 1790–1920, the economist Zorina Khan 
explains that “[e]xtensive markets in patent rights allowed inventors to extract 
returns from their activities through licensing and assigning or selling their 
rights.”64 In short, these researchers have concluded that a patent licensing 
business model is not a new phenomenon and that licensing has provided a 
profound incentive to initial innovation.65 
 
 61. Id. at 118. 
 62. William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651, 652 (1995). 
 63. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing 
Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 184–85 (2011). Howe’s newspaper ad read: 
“You that want sewing machines, be cautious how you purchase them of others than [Howe] or 
those licensed under [Howe], else the law will compel you to pay twice over.” Id. at 185 (quoting 
RUTH BRANDON, A CAPITALIST ROMANCE 90 (1977)). See also Christopher Beauchamp, 
Professor of Brooklyn Law School, Panel Discussion at the George Mason University School of 
Law Teleforum Panel: End-User Lawsuits in Patent Litigation: A Bug or a Feature of Patent Law 
(Aug. 29, 2013) (recording available at http://cpip.gmu.edu/events/teleforum-panel-end-user-
lawsuits-in-patent-litigation-a-bug-or-a-feature-of-patent-law/). During the discussion, legal 
historian Professor Christopher Beauchamp discussed his research regarding over a thousand 
patent infringement lawsuits filed in the Southern District of New York alone in 1883 against 
farmers for infringing a single patent on well drilling technology. See id. These end-user lawsuits 
were brought by a company that Professor Beauchamp recognizes as falling within the definition 
today of a PAE—a firm engaged solely in patent licensing. See id. 
 64. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 
IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 10 (2005). 
 65. Patent litigation causing national upset might not be a new phenomenon either. The 
Goodyear Vulcanite litigations were terminated in 1879 when Goodyear’s patent infringement 
manager, and company treasurer, was shot dead in San Francisco “by a particularly irate dentist 
who objected to the use of the Vulcanite patents to interfere with his dental practice.” Noonan, 
supra note 62, at 653. 
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C. Proposed Changes in Patent Law Regarding PAEs 
In 2013, multiple members of Congress proposed sweeping amendments to 
current patent laws in an effort to combat perceived problems with PAEs. 
Proposals included Senator John Cornyn’s Patent Abuse Reduction Act, 
Senator Orrin Hatch’s Patent Litigation Integrity Act, Representatives Peter 
DeFazio and Jason Chaffetz’s SHIELD Act, and Representative Robert 
Goodlatte’s Innovation Act.66 After a single hearing, on December 5, 2013, the 
U.S. House of Representatives passed the Innovation Act in what was 
described as an effort to combat “abusive practices that have damaged [the] 
patent system.”67 The “abusive practices” referenced are—in the words of the 
bill’s author, Rep. Goodlatte—“patent trolls . . . fil[ing] numerous patent 
infringement lawsuits against American businesses with the hopes of securing 
a quick payday.”68 The Innovation Act would make a number of changes to 
current patent law, including increasing allowances for defendants to stay 
cases, increasing disclosure requirements for all patent owners and investors 
with financial interests in the litigation, and forcing patent infringement case 
management rules on district court judges regarding pleadings, discovery 
timing, and cost-shifting.69 
In response to Rep. Goodlatte’s bill, Sen. Patrick Leahy, chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced a companion bill in the U.S. Senate 
entitled the Patent Transparency and Improvements Act.70 Although Sen. 
Leahy’s bill is regarded as a “less ambitious” version of the House’s 
Innovation Act, it comparably includes many of the same litigation procedural 
changes as the Innovation Act.71 The White House has already expressed 
future approval for the passage of the House patent reform bill, with President 
Obama even voicing support during his 2014 State of the Union address—
 
 66. Current Legislative Proposals for Patent Reform, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/current-legislative-proposals-patent-reform (last updated Dec. 9, 
2013). 
 67. Bartz, supra note 12 (quoting Congressman Robert Goodlatte); Andrew Williams, House 
Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Innovation Act, PATENT DOCS (Oct. 29, 2013), 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/10/house-judiciary-committee-holds-hearing-on-innovation-
act.html. 
 68. Bartz, supra note 12. 
 69. Jessica M. Karmasek, Obama Pushes for Patent Reform Bill During State of the Union, 
LEGAL NEWSLINE (Jan. 29, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/news/federal-govern 
ment/246846-obama-pushes-for-patent-reform-bill-during-state-of-the-union. 
 70. Tom Risen, Bipartisan Innovation Act Clears House, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 
6, 2013, 11:46 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/06/bipartisan-innovation-act-
clears-house. 
 71. Karmasek, supra note 69. 
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“[L]et’s pass a patent reform bill that allows our businesses to stay focused on 
innovation, not costly, needless litigation.”72 
As with the “troll” and empirical discussions regarding PAEs, opinions on 
the proposed patent reform bills have been split. Some commentators have 
argued that the Innovation Act’s changes will protect America’s businesses 
from unnecessary “predatory patent troll” litigation, while others have accused 
Congress of wanting to “create an unfair patent system where our taxpayer-
funded courts protect major corporations . . . but leave individual inventors, 
universities and start-ups out in the cold.”73 Perhaps the most notable opponent 
to the current legislative proposals is David Kappos, former director of the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. In his testimony before the House Judiciary 
Committee at the single hearing before the Innovation Act was passed, he 
stated: “[W]e are not tinkering with just any system here; we are reworking the 
greatest innovation engine the world has ever known . . . . If there were ever a 
case where caution is called for, this is it.”74 
D. Summary of Currently Popular PAE Perceptions: Patent Trolls vs. 
Horatio Alger Inventors 
The preceding analysis of recent PAE literature seems to split into two 
very divergent themes. On one hand, the bulk of literature supports the 
proverbial “patent troll” image for PAEs with bad actors and numerous 
negative effects on the economy and consumers. On the other hand, a minority 
of literature supports the idea of Cotropia’s described “individual inventor 
motif”—bringing profit to the garage inventor wanting nothing more than to 
monetize his “Flash of Genius” through a properly functioning patent system.75 
To shorten the descriptor classes for the purposes of further discussion, the 
PAE-problem literature points will be categorized as supporting proverbial 
“Patent Trolls.” Alternatively, the PAE-positive literature points will be 
categorized as supporting proverbial “Horatio Alger Inventors.”76 The resulting 
analysis points, in comparison to the case studies, will then better determine if 
PAEs are in actuality more “Patent Trolls” or “Horatio Alger Inventors.” 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. H.R. 3309 Innovation Act: Improving the Patent System to Promote American 
Innovation and Competitiveness: Hearing on H.R. 3309 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of David J. Kappos, Partner, Cravath, Swain & Moore). 
 75. Cotropia, supra note 5. 
 76. See supra Introduction and note 5 (explaining the historical descriptive term “Horatio 
Alger Inventors”). 
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Characteristics supporting an image of PAEs as Patent Trolls: 
1. PAEs do not innovate; they seek to acquire broad patent claims that 
encompass existing technologies. 
2. PAEs work to create a patent thicket—overlapping intellectual property 
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually 
commercialize new technology. 
3. PAEs delay patent issuance, asserting patents or licensing negotiations in 
furtherance of the infringing use value to the infringer increasing during 
delay. 
4. PAEs are more willing to prolong and broaden patent litigation. 
5. PAEs do not transfer earned profits to inventors. 
6. PAEs prey on startups and small companies. 
Characteristics supporting an image of PAEs as Horatio Alger Inventors: 
1. PAEs transfer resources from consumer-commercializing activities to 
innovation. 
2. PAEs stand for individual inventors who are not in the business of 
practicing inventions. 
3. PAEs spawn innovation through creation of a licensing marketplace for 
inventions. 
4. PAEs bringing a lawsuit are likely to be the same entity that filed the 
patent application initially. 
5. Individuals face a significant disadvantage in high stakes patent litigation 
unless they allow PAEs to enforce their patents. 
With these descriptor classes in hand, we can then compare the currently 
popular PAE theories gathered against case study data. 
II.  CASE STUDIES AS A TYPE OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
A. Usefulness and Limitations of Case Studies 
Case studies are an important part of empirical research used to illustrate 
or disprove theories proposed in other analyses.77 They are an “empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its 
 
 77. “Case studies . . . are important genres of empirical research that not only can yield 
important insights but have the additional virtue that legal scholars with limited resources can 
undertake them.” Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 323–24 (1989). “Case studies are a social scientific research method of 
particular value to lawyers and public health advocates.” Julie Graves Krishnaswami, Nicholas 
Freudenberg: A Selected Bibliography to Accompany A Conversation on Health and Law, 12 
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 55, 57 (2008). See, e.g., KHAN, supra note 64, at 23; Mossoff, supra note 63, 
at 203. 
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real-life context.”78 Further, as a preliminary step in research, case studies are 
an initial building block scholars can undertake and use to tailor greater 
research plans.79 As discussed supra, while historical case studies of PAEs 
have been conducted,80 and much current empirical research has been 
undertaken,81 thus far no research has investigated detailed facts regarding the 
inventors PAEs represent and the invention stories behind patents asserted by 
PAEs. 
The case study analysis here is neither generalizable nor intended to 
represent a sampling for scientific generalizations.82 Instead, the purpose is to 
test the previously developed PAE theories on a new research focus to develop 
hypotheses that may then be tested systematically with a larger number of 
cases.83 “If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, 
replication may be claimed. The empirical results may be considered yet more 
potent if two or more cases support the same theory but do not support an 
equally plausible, rival theory.”84 
To begin the case study research for this Article, the author contacted 
numerous legal academics, practitioners, and the largest PAE holding 
companies. The author, and a fellow academic colleague, also posted an 
anonymous request for PAEs willing to share information on the popular 
patent law websites, Patently-O85 and IPWatchdog.86 The focus of the search 
 
 78. ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 18 (4th ed. 2009). 
 79. Schuck, supra note 77, at 324. See also David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: 
Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 
1056 n.183 (1989) (“Although the case method represents a less than scientific way to test 
hypotheses, it often provides stimulus for hypothesis development and thus scientific 
advancement.”). 
 80. See, e.g., KHAN, supra note 64; Mossoff, supra note 63; Adam Mossoff, Who Cares 
What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in 
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007); Beauchamp, supra note 63. 
 81. See supra Part I.B. 
 82. YIN, supra note 78, at 15 (“[C]ase studies . . . provide little basis for scientific 
generalization. . . . [The investigator’s] goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytic 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).”). 
 83. “The detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena, a case study 
cannot provide reliable information about the broader class, but it may be useful in the 
preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides hypotheses which may be tested 
systematically with a larger number of cases.” NICHOLAS ABERCROMBIE ET AL., THE PENGUIN 
DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 34 (1984). 
 84. YIN, supra note 78, at 38–39. 
 85. Dennis Crouch, What Is Your Experience with Patent Assertion Entities and Patent 
Licensing?, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/10/what-is-your-
experience-with-patent-assertion-entities-and-patent-licensing.html (posting anonymous request 
for information). 
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was to interview PAEs that were willing to share a patent conception and entity 
creation story from start to finish. The initial requests for information, 
however, were left generic regarding the use of the information. The emphasis 
was to find PAEs that had original source materials to verify the validity of 
information, thus ensuring independent verification of entity and invention 
history.87 
Surprisingly, despite the seemingly infinite amount of information 
available discussing PAEs, there was very little factual detail regarding PAEs 
obtainable. While countless practitioners, patent entity representatives, and 
large PAE holding companies were willing to share information in confidence, 
there were a variety of reasons presented that limited the sharing of 
information or review of original source materials concerning invention or the 
entity. Reasons included: 
 The PAEs contacted were mostly all involved in active litigation that 
presented too great a risk to have original, and potentially privileged, 
documents shared with a third party or to have inventors speaking openly 
on-the-record regarding the history of their invention or company. 
 The patent licenses between the PAEs and licensees prohibit disclosure of 
the patent detail, license detail, or dealings with any licensees. 
 Licenses between inventors and PAE holding companies require that 
inventors not disclose any information regarding the history of their 
invention or patent. 
 Any litigation regarding patents asserted by PAEs is not in the public record 
due to sealed orders or agreements between the parties to not disclose 
documents exchanged or details regarding the litigation. 
Further, PAEs that successfully assert their patents and obtain licenses without 
litigation are almost impossible to locate due to the lack of any public record of 
the assertion or license. 
Thankfully, through both the anonymous website requests and contact 
leads through academic colleagues, four PAEs that were initially willing to 
share information were identified. From these four, it was decided that two 
entities would be ideal for the case study.88 
 
 86. Gene Quinn, Call for Information: Study on Patent Assertion Entities, IPWATCHDOG 
(Oct. 9, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/10/09/call-for-information-study-
on-patent-assertion-entities/id=45658 (posting anonymous request for information). 
 87. Given the emphasis to find PAEs with original source material, it is recognized this 
could skew selection of PAEs—those willing to provide materials, potentially of a certain type. 
Since the purpose was case study research, as opposed to generalizable empirical research, the 
potential selection bias is acceptable. 
 88. Due to the limited space allowed in this Article, it was determined that only two case 
study entities should be used. The two entities preliminarily investigated for case study but not 
used were Civix-DDI, LLC and OIP Technologies, Inc. These entities were not used for the 
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B. The Two Case Study PAEs 
The first case study entity, MercExchange, was selected for a variety of 
reasons. First, the case and parties are quite well known in all legal circles after 
the appeal from the Federal Circuit to the Supreme Court and the resulting 
Supreme Court opinion. Second, MercExchange is often referred to as the 
quintessential PAE or “troll” due to, among other things, its request for an 
injunction to restrict eBay’s online business.89 Third, the inventor of the 
MercExchange patent, Tom Woolston, and the lead counsel for 
MercExchange, Greg Stillman, partner at Hunton & Williams LLP, were both 
willing to share information and documents regarding the patent and case, and 
they were also both willing to communicate on the record. Fourth, the patent 
infringement dispute between eBay and MercExchange went through full 
litigation proceedings, including lengthy discovery, trial, and appeal. Much of 
the record created through the proceedings, including over 5000 pages of trial 
transcripts and thousands of exhibit pages, were all publicly available. These 
original documents, with much detailed direct and cross-examination 
testimony, serve as an excellent base for understanding Woolston’s invention 
and the true history of MercExchange. While certain details are based on 
interviews with Woolston, as the citations indicate, a vast majority of detail is 
strictly based on review of the original documents. 
In contrast to MercExchange, the second case study entity, Capital 
Security Systems (CSS), was selected for its relatively unknown prominence. 
First, while existing for almost as long as MercExchange (over fifteen years), 
and having filed infringement actions against many large companies (including 
Diebold, Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, and Wells Fargo Bank), CSS has had 
very little media coverage and its infringement litigations have ended relatively 
quickly. Second, and similar to MercExchange, CSS would fit the mold of a 
PAE as it has been understood in the current literature. CSS is a company that 
does not sell any products and is partnered for licensing with IPNav, a 
company described by The New York Times as “[having] a batch of patents, 
 
following reasons: due to active litigation, some factual resources related to the entity could not 
be provided; due to active litigation, entity counsel advised that on-record communication directly 
with inventors should not be allowed; and only a limited number of publicly available documents 
concerning the entities and inventions could be located. It should be noted, however, that from 
preliminary research regarding these entities, the general factual story of these inventors, 
inventions, and entities was no different than the two case study entities utilized. 
 89. Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange 
L.L.C., supra note 24, at 1005–09; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 28, at 2141–42. See also 
Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (“In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C. decision, district courts rarely grant injunctions in patent infringement 
cases to patent-assertion entities (PAEs, also known as ‘patent trolls’).”). 
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demanding a license fee from what it contends is an infringer, usually a titan in 
the tech realm.”90 IPNav describes its approach to doing business as follows: 
Because the patent system is based on patent holders being willing to go to 
court to enforce their rights, many patent monetization firms are litigation 
driven. At IPNav we’re not afraid to litigate, and we work with first-rate patent 
litigators, but we’ve found that alternatives to litigation often produce better 
and faster results.91 
Third, CSS owner and primary inventor, Robin Gustin, was willing to share 
information and documents regarding CSS and its patents and was also willing 
to communicate openly regarding the invention and entity history. Obtaining 
primary historical documents regarding CSS was most important for the CSS 
case study since there was no lengthy litigation or media record.92 
III.  CASE STUDIES OF INSTRUCTIVE PAES 
A. MercExchange, L.L.C. and Inventor Thomas G. Woolston 
1. The History of Thomas G. Woolston 
The sole inventor of the MercExchange-owned patents is Thomas G. 
Woolston.93 Mr. Woolston was born in Michigan and raised in Ohio.94 After 
completing high school, he enlisted in the United States Air Force and was 
trained for a year in electronics, computers, and radar systems, and a second 
year in modern computers, telecommunications systems, and cryptography.95 
After serving for a few years on a crew stationed in Japan doing peacetime 
aerial reconnaissance, Mr. Woolston was assigned to the National Security 
Agency in Maryland and began taking classes in computer science at the 
University of Maryland.96 
Upon honorable discharge from the Air Force, Mr. Woolston began work 
with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), assigned to build and maintain 
 
 90. David Segal, Has Patent. Will Sue, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at BU1. 
 91. Our Core Beliefs, IPNAV, http://www.ipnav.com/about-us/our-philosophy (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2014). 
 92. For these reasons the two case study PAEs fit the majority mold of ideal “trolls” 
discussed in the previous Parts and are accordingly labeled as “instructive.” 
 93. U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176 (filed Mar. 8, 
1999). 
 94. Transcript of Record at 304, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 
(E.D. Va. 2003) (No. 2:01-CV-736); Julia Wilkinson, The eBay Patent Wars: Interview with 
MercExchange CEO Thomas Woolston, ECOMMERCEBYTES (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.ecom 
mercebytes.com/cab/abn/y04/m09/i30/s01. 
 95. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 305. 
 96. Id. at 306. 
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CIA global communications networks.97 While at the CIA, Mr. Woolston 
worked primarily as an engineer, planning and finding uses for CIA computer 
networks.98 Mr. Woolston also continued his studies at The George 
Washington University, focusing in electrical and computer engineering and 
completing a degree in electrical engineering in 1991.99 
Before leaving the CIA, Mr. Woolston continued his studies and began 
attending The George Washington University School of Law at night.100 He 
worked at the CIA for a total of six years before beginning work as a law clerk 
and attorney at several private law firms.101 
2. The History of the Primary MercExchange Patents 
The MercExchange-owned patents Mr. Woolston invented relate to e-
commerce and the internet. Mr. Woolston had knowledge of technology in 
these areas since the 1980s when he spent time working with supercomputers 
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.102 In 1993, when Mr. 
Woolston learned that the United States government was going to privatize the 
internet for business use, he started thinking about commercial uses that a large 
internet network would allow.103 His breakthrough idea occurred in the 
summer of 1994, when he heard a radio news report regarding the Major 
League Baseball players’ strike.104 The radio report discussed a baseball-card 
store in McLean, Virginia (close to Woolston at the time) that was going out of 
business due to loss of customers and anti-baseball resentment in Northern 
Virginia caused by the strike.105 
In 1994, Mr. Woolston saw three primary options for a small business 
collectible baseball-card store to advertise and sell cards to a customer far 
outside their geographical area.106 The first option was advertising bulletin 
boards and electronic versions of bulletin boards.107 These boards and similar 
newspaper classified postings posed a variety of problems, including the fact 
that the advertisement continues to be viewed after the good is sold, and 
despite there being an advertisement for the good, the seller is under no 
 
 97. Id. at 307. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 307–08. 
 100. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 308. 
 101. Id. at 308–09. 
 102. Id. at 309. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 310, 448;Wilkinson, supra note 94. 
 105. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 310. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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obligation to sell—the advertisement is just an invitation to continue 
negotiations.108 
The second existing option Mr. Woolston saw for a coast-to-coast 
collectible sale was a catalog or electronic version of a catalog.109 Like bulletin 
boards or classified ads, Mr. Woolston saw catalog sales as problematic in that 
the seller could run out of stock for an item prior to a customer seeing the item 
in the catalog and wanting to purchase.110 In Woolston’s mind, the limited 
inventory and delay in communication was a fundamental problem for a small-
inventory collectible sale.111 
Finally, the third option for a coast-to-coast collectible sale was a 
television show like the Home Shopping Channel—where a viewer watches a 
show, sees an item that is currently available being advertised and sold, and 
viewers across the country are given the opportunity to call and purchase the 
item.112 Mr. Woolston was impressed by the immediate nature of the Home 
Shopping Channel advertisement and sale but hoped to innovate on it.113 
Woolston thought there would be value in an expanded version of the Home 
Shopping Channel, where a viewer could contact the Channel, describe an item 
for sale, and then the Channel would advertise the item across the country until 
another viewer called in to purchase and the item was sold.114 Woolston 
envisioned that the opportunity created by private uses of the internet would 
allow for an invention that innovated on a live-Home Shopping Channel type 
sales environment for collectible items.115 
Accordingly, in the summer of 1994, Mr. Woolston used his background in 
computers, computer networks, and a voice-over-network application he built 
for the CIA, to create a solution that used the newly available internet in an e-
commerce collectible sales invention.116 Woolston knew about communication 
interfaces to allow computers to communicate with other computers in a 
network and also knew about databases, credit card processing, and credit card 
encryption necessary for an internet sales system.117 He put all that unique 
personal knowledge together and for eight months worked to create “a 
 
 108. Id. at 310–11. 
 109. Id. at 312. 
 110. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 312. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 312–13. 
 113. Id. at 313. 
 114. Id. at 312–13. 
 115. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 312–14. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 314. 
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technical document that could actually perform the concept” for which he filed 
a patent on in April 1995.118 
While testifying under oath at trial in MercExchange v. eBay, Mr. 
Woolston described how his invention would likely be “very helpful to small 
businesses and individual sellers.”119 He described how the invention would 
provide great value to the “small-town collector get[ting] to the bigger markets 
and get[ting] a fair price for his item and sell[ing] them when he wanted to.”120 
Woolston further testified that he wanted to build a business from the 
invention, for profit, and how getting a patent “was what you were supposed to 
do[,] . . . [what] you needed to do to build a business.”121 He understood the 
process to be: “file for a patent application, . . . organize a company around the 
idea, . . . then try to get people interested in investing or joining . . . , and then 
build[ ] a company.”122 
In discussing his motivation to invent almost two decades later, Mr. 
Woolston states that his motivation came from the patent system’s function to 
give inventors the right to exclude. “Patents give inventors the tangible right to 
do it alone.”123 He went on to say that “in 1994, no one thought anyone would 
ever buy an antique or collectible sight unseen on the Internet.”124 Without 
patent protection, Woolston assumes, “why [would an inventor] educate the 
marketplace and work on an independent idea if someone else could copy the 
idea?”125 Accordingly, Woolston’s business plan for his invention anticipated 
that “once he got the patent, investors would want to move forward.”126 
3. The History of MercExchange 
The first step in Mr. Woolston’s plans to create profit and implement his 
invention was to form a company.127 This was particularly important because 
the invention’s fundamental system would “cost a lot of money . . . . to 
build.”128 While working full time at his day job, Woolston founded his first 
 
 118. Wilkinson, supra note 94. See also Brief for Respondent at 1, eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130); Transcript of Record, supra note 94, 
at 316, 649. Spring 1995 was also when Mr. Woolston graduated from law school. See id. at 308. 
 119. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 314. 
 120. Id. at 315. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Telephone Interview with Thomas G. Woolston, Founder, MercExchange (Oct. 15, 
2013). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 490–91. 
 128. Id. at 487–88. In some correspondences, Mr. Woolston details development and 
operating costs for the Fleanet business plan at over $100,000.00 per month. Id. at 516–19. 
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company, Fleanet, in 1995.129 Its purpose was to “attract capital, attract people 
and talent necessary to build e-commerce [and an] e-commerce company . . . in 
Virginia.”130 
Once Fleanet was formed, Mr. Woolston began reaching out to friends and 
close acquaintances for business investment.131 Mr. Woolston drafted business 
plans describing his invention, including what he saw as the best way to 
implement the system, and began corresponding with whoever would listen 
and be interested in partnering with him or investing in Fleanet.132 In January 
1996, Mr. Woolston was in communication with many individuals and 
companies, including MCI WorldCom and a series of venture capitalists, travel 
agencies, web developers, antique dealers, art dealers, and George Mason 
University.133 While the initial patent application was still pending, but after 
gaining some business partners and investors, the Fleanet name was dropped, 
and Woolston’s company became “MercExchange.”134 Between 1996 and 
1998, raising capital continued to be difficult for Mr. Woolston and 
MercExchange, with conversations with one venture capital firm resulting in 
“screaming [at Woolston] . . . that no one will ever buy an antique or 
collectible over the internet.”135 
MercExchange’s breakthrough for investment finally came in December 
1998 when its first patent issued and the Wall Street Journal published a 
January 1999 article on MercExchange regarding its patent interference 
proceeding pending against PriceLine.com.136 Mr. Woolston said “[i]t was like 
magic within six weeks [of patent issuance], we had our first licensee; and 
within six months, I’d been lured out of the legal profession into the dot-com 
world.”137 The first licensee of the MercExchange technology was Aden 
Enterprises, an internet incubator company based out of Omaha, Nebraska.138 
Mr. Woolston began full-time work with Aden in October of 1999 to begin 
development of auction software for a subsidiary of Aden known as LeftBid.139 
Unfortunately for Mr. Woolston, Aden was not a focused enterprise, was 
 
 129. Id. at 490, 495. 
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 131. Id. at 494–96. 
 132. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 497–500. 
 133. Id. at 503–04, 532–36. See also Joint Appendix at 311, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
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 134. Wilkinson, supra note 94. 
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attempting to build an online auction system that was different from his 
invention,140 and became too entangled with other companies and 
subsidiaries.141 Woolston eventually left the Aden companies in early 2000 and 
began communications with other potential partners including I-Fly, Christie’s, 
and Tiger Direct.142 
4. MercExchange’s Communications with eBay 
In the spring of 2000, Mr. Woolston also began communications with 
eBay—a multi-million dollar online auction business—in an attempt to build a 
MercExchange system that would, in part, gather information from online 
auctions held on ebay.com.143 eBay was not facilitating transactions on its 
website at that time, so there were fundamental differences between eBay’s 
processes and what MercExchange was hoping to build with Woolston’s 
invention.144 Through the communications with eBay, in the summer of 2000, 
eBay became interested in purchasing MercExchange’s patents.145 The timing 
could not have been better for Woolston “because [his] company was falling 
apart.”146 To further the conversation, MercExchange gave eBay’s attorneys a 
confidential presentation regarding all its pending patents and their current 
status in the Patent Office.147 The presentation seemed to go well, and, as 
Woolston recalled, the eBay attorneys communicated, “Wow, we’re really 
interested. . . . This is it; we can put the top back on the Genie[’]s bottle.”148 
Soon thereafter, however, eBay requested that MercExchange provide the full 
prosecution histories of the MercExchange patents.149 The requests continued, 
and through the negotiations requesting that MercExchange send all patent 
files to eBay’s attorneys’ offices in California, Mr. Woolston began to get “the 
distinct . . . impression that eBay was trying to get a jump on [a] lawsuit, 
because [they] weren’t dealing in good faith.”150 
 
 140. Id. at 344–45. 
 141. Id. at 344, 577–78; Wilkinson, supra note 94. 
 142. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 579–81, 592. 
 143. Id. at 581–82, 590. The MercExchange system being developed in early 2000 would be 
effectively outlawed when eBay’s new tort of computer trespass was established in eBay, Inc. v. 
Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). E-mail from Thomas G. Woolston, 
Founder, MercExchange, to author (Jan. 9, 2014, 11:02 PM) (on file with author). 
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now” features on its website and sent all eBay transactions to separate partner-company websites 
to facilitate payments. Accordingly, prior to 2000, eBay could not have infringed 
MercExchange’s patents. See id. 
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After a few months of negotiations with eBay, it became MercExchange’s 
position that eBay was “looking for ways to kill the patents instead of buying 
them.”151 The negotiations ended, and, according to Mr. Woolston, within 
three months “eBay was infringing every patent we had.”152 MercExchange 
made the decision to file suit against eBay for patent infringement in mid-
2001.153 The case was filed on September 26, 2001 in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia.154 
5. The Current Status of MercExchange 
The MercExchange v. eBay patent infringement lawsuit resulted in a five-
week trial and a May 27, 2003 jury verdict for MercExchange with a $29.5 
million judgment entered on August 7, 2003.155 The parties then continued 
disputes up to the United States Supreme Court in 2006 regarding the issue of 
whether an injunction should issue against eBay.156 The parties returned to the 
district court in late 2006 regarding further proceedings related to an injunction 
and patent reexaminations.157 
MercExchange’s request for an injunction was again denied on July 27, 
2007, and the parties returned to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
December 2007 after eBay was required to post a bond of $31 million.158 The 
dispute between MercExchange and eBay finally settled in 2008.159 The 
settlement resulted in the sale and full assignment, from MercExchange to 
eBay, of all MercExchange patents and patent applications related to online 
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auctions.160 Neither MercExchange nor Mr. Woolston have been involved in 
any further patent infringement lawsuits since settling with eBay.161 
The MercExchange company still exists and currently holds two patents 
related to “using internet router hardware as massively parallel sort engines for 
topographically organizing web content like an auction instance.”162 The 
current MercExchange patents are available for purchase or license but there 
are no current marketing or development efforts for those inventions.163 
6. The Current Status of Thomas G. Woolston 
Mr. Woolston is currently the listed inventor of twenty-four patents, with 
his most recent patent related to an “Electronic Gaming Device with 
Feedback.”164 He is on the Advisory Board of the Krasnow Institute for 
Advanced Study,165 the Intellectual Property Advisory Committee to the 
Virginia Joint Commission on Technology and Science,166 and also has an 
active consulting practice specializing in raising capital for university research 
and technology startup companies. 
B. Capital Security Systems, Inc. and Robin H. Gustin 
1. The History of Robin H. Gustin 
The primary inventor of the Capital Security Systems patents is Robin 
Haley Gustin.167 Ms. Gustin was born and raised in the suburbs of Chicago, 
Illinois.168 She attended the University of Illinois at Chicago and graduated in 
1986 with a BS degree in Business Sciences.169 After completing her degree, 
she worked in the insurance and financial planning industry at a family 
business, the Gustin Financial Services firm, until 1990.170 
Following her interest in manufacturing and her talents in sales, in 1990, 
Ms. Gustin accepted an account representative position with iVEX Protective 
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Packaging Inc., a Hillside, Illinois based industrial packaging manufacturer.171 
Ms. Gustin worked at iVEX for three years, distinguishing herself as the top 
sales person in the Midwest Region.172 In 1993, she was recruited to work for 
Bemis Company, Inc., a Minneapolis, Minnesota business specializing in 
industrial plastics packaging.173 While at Bemis, Ms. Gustin traveled 
throughout the Midwest helping manufacturers of all types improve their 
production packaging efficiency.174 Her position at Bemis was as much 
technical as it was client relations; through this experience, Ms. Gustin greatly 
expanded her knowledge of automating systems and human-computer 
processes.175 
2. The History of the Primary Capital Security Systems Patents and 
Capital Security Systems 
In 1993, while visiting a friend in Arizona who owned a number of check 
cashing stores, Ms. Gustin began thinking of ways to help her friend resolve an 
issue of employee theft.176 The theft problem related to multiple employee-
only processes involved in check cashing and a lack of electronic systems to 
review and confirm the high cash-on-hand check cashing process.177 When Ms. 
Gustin returned to Illinois from the trip, she used her “background in 
manufacturing and automating systems” to create a method for electronically 
“emulate[ing] the primary functions of [the] check cashing” process.178 Ms. 
Gustin’s solution to the check cashing store problem centered around 
automating the cashing of checks through a machine process that included 
“machine recognition of printed and handwritten amounts on checks.”179 For 
the next two years, Ms. Gustin spent countless hours—many at the Harold 
Washington Library in downtown Chicago—researching automation 
technology, bank networks, automated teller machine (ATM) systems, and 
electronic payments within check cashing processes.180 A key portion of her 
research focused on components to automate a new type of ATM machine, 
originally called “The Money Exchange Machine.”181 Ms. Gustin also worked 
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to find recognition software “that could intelligently scan hand printed and 
cursive field data in order to process the checks in an ATM environment.”182 
After two years of painstaking research and analysis, in late 1995, Ms. 
Gustin formalized her discovery of unfulfilled needs in the electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) market, particularly in the areas of ATM banking for 
recognizing handwritten check fields for electronic check processing.183 
Sensing a business need in the EFT market, and the government-sponsored 
electronic benefits transfer market, Ms. Gustin left her position at Bemis to 
start her own company called Capital Security Systems, Inc. (CSS).184 Her 
intent with CSS was to work as an inventor, complete designs and prototype 
building of an electronic check depositing machine, and partner with other 
companies for manufacturing.185 Ms. Gustin personally raised approximately 
$1 million in seed capital to fund CSS and began work on the “ATM 
PowerBuilder” and “Super ATM” platform.186 
From 1995 to 1997, Ms. Gustin worked full time at CSS to perfect the 
designs, systems, and prototype for the CSS Super ATM.187 She hired 
Livingston Products, Inc. to build a prototype ATM machine, and she hired 
Arthur Gingrande, a leading expert in text recognition technology, to consult 
for CSS regarding sourcing of software components into the prototype.188 In 
1996, Mr. Gingrande referred Ms. Gustin to Mitek Systems in San Diego, 
California, a company specializing in “technology that facilitates courtesy 
amount recognition (CAR) and legal amount recognition (LAR) on checks.”189 
After contracting with Mitek to begin work for CSS, Ms. Gustin relocated to 
San Diego to help with the process of “incorporat[ing] their CAR/LAR 
software engines into an ATM environment.”190 
In May of 1997, after completing an early version of the Super ATM 
prototype, Ms. Gustin and CSS filed for three patents related to enhancements 
on the electronic cashing and ATM systems being developed.191 The patents 
related to: “Check fraud detection (signature verification)”; “Wiring funds 
from one account to another in an ATM environment”; and “Downloading 
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dollars and cents left over from a transaction on an ATM network to a smart 
card.”192 When making the decision for CSS to file for patent protection, Ms. 
Gustin communicated with other inventors who owned patents and discussed 
the issues with her design partners who helped build the CSS Super ATM.193 
She “knew patents would be the only protection for the idea[s] [she] spent 
many years…develop[ing].”194 To her, patents were the “sole protection to 
further invention”—before she spoke with other companies about her ideas, 
she needed to protect them with patent filings.195 
After filing for patent protection in May 1997, Ms. Gustin went on a multi-
year “road show” to banks and other large financial institutions in the hopes of 
finding commercial partners.196 She contacted banks directly, created 
marketing materials and videos of her Super ATM prototype in operation,197 
and attended various banking industry events.198 Ms. Gustin’s log of activity 
from 1997 to 2001 included hundreds of meetings, including prototype Super 
ATM demonstrations to Diebold, Inc., Siemens-AutoTell, and IBM.199 
Throughout the process of communicating with large commercial partners, Ms. 
Gustin encountered much opposition to the potential success of her design.200 
At one point, in 1998, a high-level manager from IBM remarked that 
“electronic transfers of cash will replace checks, making the Super ATM 
platform obsolete.”201 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, seeing an opportunity to help 
increase the tracking of funds to prevent further terrorist attacks, in 2002, Ms. 
Gustin hired a Washington, D.C. law firm to assist with introducing the Super 
ATM platform to government agencies.202 Related to these efforts and the 
national security need to track funds, in October 2003, Congress passed 
legislation known as the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21 
Act) that allowed the recipient of an original paper check to create a digital 
version of the original check and eliminate the need for further handling of the 
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physical document.203 The law was scheduled to take effect in October 2004, 
and Ms. Gustin hoped that the Check 21 Act would serve as a “catalyst [to] 
spur the banking industry to license the Super ATM patented platform.”204 
Unfortunately for Ms. Gustin, the timing was still not right. 
3. Capital Security System’s Communications with Commercial Partners 
Given the already widespread use of electronic check scanning ATM 
machines, Ms. Gustin continued to reach out to large ATM manufacturing 
companies, including Diebold and NCR,205 this time looking for commercial 
partners or licensors of her patent portfolio.206 Coming up short with the larger 
companies again, Ms. Gustin began to contact smaller financial institutions. It 
was during these communications in 2005 that the business development 
manager of a smaller financial services company said, “[W]hy should [we] 
take a license or buy the Super ATM platform when everyone is 
infringing?”207 In response to communications along these lines, Ms. Gustin 
began to accept the conclusion that legal action to prosecute infringers would 
have to be her final option.208 
4. The Current Status of Capital Security Systems 
In 2006, seeing little option for business partners and widespread 
infringement of her patent portfolio, Ms. Gustin began communications with 
various attorneys regarding the prospect of patent infringement lawsuits to 
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enforce CSS’s patent portfolio.209 Ms. Gustin initially had issues with finding 
law firms that would represent her against large banking clients; however, 
between 2006 and 2008, she began the organization of materials necessary to 
prepare for a large patent infringement lawsuit.210 At this time, CSS also filed 
multiple international patents and continued its U.S. patent prosecution 
activities.211 
Among other legal actions,212 in 2010, CSS sent a letter to Diebold 
asserting that Diebold infringed at least two of the CSS-owned patents.213 In 
January 2011, Diebold filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio seeking declaratory relief under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act for harms associated with CSS’s 2010 letter.214 This became the 
first substantive case of patent infringement for CSS, and litigation continued 
until a September 2011 mediation report stated, “Settlement was reached, 
subject to preparation and agreement on the settlement documents.”215 A 
November 2011 order from the district court dismissed the case “pursuant to 
. . . the parties’ confidential License and Settlement Agreement.”216 
Moving on to the banks that utilize ATM machines, in September 2012, 
after seeking expertise and funding partnership with IPNav,217 CSS filed suit 
against JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo Bank 
NA, Wells Fargo & Co., Compass Bank, and BBVA Compass Bancshare, Inc. 
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for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas.218 Litigation continued for a little over one year until a November 19, 
2013 filing stated that the plaintiff and defendants “hereby move for an order 
dismissing all claims . . . subject to the terms of that certain agreement entitled 
‘AGREEMENT’ and dated November 13, 2013, with each party to bear its 
own costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees.”219 An Order of Dismissal With 
Prejudice was entered by the court on November 21, 2013.220 
As of January 2014, CSS currently has multiple licenses of its patent 
portfolio but does not have any litigation pending.221 CSS is currently still 
partnered with IPNav.222 
5. The Current Status of Robin H. Gustin 
Ms. Gustin is now the listed inventor of six U.S. patents with over 780 
forward citations, including some from leading ATM manufacturers and 
financial institutions.223 After nineteen years of working full-time and “sinking 
her life savings into CSS,” she now assists her patent monetization legal team 
full-time with documentation and coordination of company materials.224 
IV.  INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CASE STUDIES 
A. Fundamental Differences and Similarities Within the PAE Case Studies 
Comparing the two PAE case studies reveals both fundamental differences 
and similarities in the inventor and invention stories leading up to the patent 
assertions. Regarding differences, first, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin are from 
geographically different parts of the United States: Mr. Woolston went to 
school, worked, and started his company in northern Virginia; Ms. Gustin went 
to school, worked, and started her company in metropolitan Chicago. Second, 
both inventors have very different educational backgrounds: Mr. Woolston was 
initially trained in the Air Force and then went on to study engineering and law 
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at university; Ms. Gustin studied business in university and then learned 
manufacturing and automation processes while working at packaging 
companies before independently studying the ATM check cashing industry. 
Regarding further differences, third, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin’s 
inventions relate to completely different markets and products: Mr. Woolston’s 
inventions relate to new commercial uses for the internet in commerce and the 
sale of goods through internet commerce; Ms. Gustin’s inventions relate to 
electronic financial processes and the capabilities of modern ATM machines. 
Fourth, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin followed different inventive steps: Mr. 
Woolston had an invention idea in the summer of 1994, then spent months 
working by himself to create a detailed technical document that could perform 
the concept before filing for patent protection individually in 1995; Ms. Gustin 
learned of the check cashing process shortfalls in 1993, then spent a few years 
learning about the ATM and financial industry before founding a company, 
raising capital, hiring engineers to build a prototype, and filing for patent 
protection—with other inventors listed—in 1997. 
Regarding similarities between the case studies, first, Mr. Woolston and 
Ms. Gustin both operated on similar timelines: they both conceived of 
inventions and filed for patent protection in the early/mid 1990s, they both 
attempted to build companies and raise capital around the inventions for five to 
ten years, and then they both made the decision to enforce their patent rights 
through litigation. Second, both Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin began enforcing 
their patent rights against companies they originally sought business 
partnership relationships from long before the companies infringed the patents. 
Regarding further similarities, third, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin both 
initially attempted to build and manage their own companies around their 
inventions—even putting careers on hold and investing life savings into the 
companies; neither inventor founded their company with a business model 
associated with patent litigation. Fourth, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin were 
both met with great skepticism during the initial discussions with investors and 
partners regarding the feasibility of their inventions.225 Fifth, both Mr. 
Woolston and Ms. Gustin saw obtaining a patent for their invention as the only 
protection possible to protect their business, the protection to give them the 
ability to share their ideas and raise capital for their business, and the 
fundamental motivation for them to invest in and develop revolutionary new 
ideas. It is noteworthy that two inventors with no relationship to each other—
who have never met or spoken and who have completely different 
backgrounds—both describe such similar motivations to invent: Mr. Woolston 
noted that “[without a patent,] why [would an inventor] educate the 
marketplace and work on an independent idea if someone else could copy the 
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idea?”; Ms. Gustin noted that “[patents are] the sole protection to further 
invention.”226 
B. Comparison of Case Study Facts to the Currently Popular PAE Theories 
As discussed in Part I, the recent PAE literature splits in two very different 
directions regarding PAEs exemplifying pre-described “Patent Trolls” or 
“Horatio Alger Inventors” characteristics. Accordingly, the following section 
will analyze the case study facts to each characteristic identified in Part I. As 
discussed in Part II, the following comparisons—based on two limited case 
studies—cannot be used to draw general conclusions regarding a class of all 
PAEs. The purpose instead is to test the currently popular PAE theories on a 
new research focus to create an additional incremental data point. The research 
focus may then be tested systematically with a larger number of cases. 
1. Characteristics of PAEs Refuting a Patent Troll Image 
PAEs do not innovate; they seek to acquire broad patent claims that 
encompass existing technologies. 
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. The ideas of 
both Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin were very innovative at the time both 
inventors began development—so innovative they were rejected by industry 
leaders as impractical. Further, both inventors filed for initial patent protection 
with the intent of building their own companies and commercializing their own 
ideas. There is no material to support a notion that the MercExchange or CSS 
patents were initially filed for any future patent litigation use.227 
PAEs work to create a patent thicket—overlapping intellectual property rights 
that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize 
new technology. 
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. The initial 
patent filings of both Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin were completed with the 
strict intent of protecting their own ideas in furtherance of commercializing 
their own inventions. The single patent that Mr. Woolston filed in April 1995 
was focused around his own collectible sales business plan. The three patents 
Ms. Gustin filed in May 1997 were for enhancements to the existing electronic 
check cashing and ATM systems in the marketplace—all patents were 
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developed from an early version of the Super ATM prototype she had worked 
on for years with multiple consultants. 
PAEs delay patent issuance, asserting patents or licensing negotiations in 
furtherance of the infringing use value to the infringer increasing during delay. 
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. For Mr. 
Woolston and MercExchange, patent issuance was always seen as the solution 
to delays with raising capital. Accordingly, expediting the patent review 
process to more quickly fund and expand MercExchange was a primary goal. 
Additionally, when MercExchange began communicating with eBay regarding 
patent licenses, eBay was not infringing. Once eBay did begin to infringe the 
MercExchange patents, MercExchange filed suit in less than a year—there was 
no delay. In the same way, CSS filed for patent protection as quickly as 
possible so Ms. Gustin could begin her “road show” to banks and other 
financial institutions in the hopes of finding commercial partners. She also 
repeatedly contacted companies, like Diebold, to engage in partnership 
discussions and, years later, to discuss patent licensing. While Diebold’s filing 
of a declaratory judgment action might support a notion that CSS was delaying 
a lawsuit, the fact that Diebold had been contacted by Ms. Gustin almost a 
decade before (regarding a partnership to manufacture her Super ATM) 
negates any notion of delay on the part of CSS. 
PAEs are more willing to prolong and broaden patent litigation. 
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. Regarding 
MercExchange, the trial litigation tactics, procedural facts regarding appeals, 
and the district court’s forcing of a bond to be posted after the Supreme Court 
appeal (because there was still no resolution between the parties), most 
certainly draws the inference that it was eBay prolonging the litigation, 
settlements, and proceedings. Regarding CSS, the facts are unclear since there 
has not been an infringement trial or other substantive litigation proceeding 
involving the patents. In the short litigation that has ensued, it does appear that 
quick settlement—or simply a quick end to litigation in cases of non-
infringement—has occurred in every proceeding. 
PAEs do not transfer earned profits to inventors. 
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. Perhaps most 
clear from Mr. Woolston’s and Ms. Gustin’s stories is that the initial individual 
inventor behind each of the patents asserted in litigation are still the owners of 
the patents and the primary recipients of profits earned from the infringement 
litigation. While one of the most prominent patent monetization firms did 
partner with Ms. Gustin (IPNav), that partnership was only in furtherance of 
Ms. Gustin being able to earn profits from her invention and not be unfairly 
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disadvantaged in litigation against large companies with large litigation 
budgets. 
PAEs prey on startups and small companies. 
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. Regarding Mr. 
Woolston and MercExchange, the case against eBay was filed in 2001. While 
eBay was a startup internet success story in the mid-1990s, by 2001 eBay was 
already a huge multi-million dollar company. Beyond the eBay lawsuit, there 
is no evidence to suggest that MercExchange was ever planning to assert its 
patents against any small startup companies.228 Regarding Ms. Gustin and 
CSS, neither of the two patent infringement suits CSS filed were against small 
companies. The September 2010 Central District of California case229 was filed 
against Co-Op Financial Services (CU Cooperative Systems, Inc.), “the 
nation’s largest credit union service organization,”230 and the September 2012 
Eastern District of Texas case targeted some of the largest banks in the 
country—JPMorgan Chase Bank, Wells Fargo Bank, and Compass Bank.231 
In fact, when looking for a proverbial “David vs. Goliath” story regarding 
patent infringement, both case studies show numerous examples of a small 
startup patent owner—attempting to gain investors or build a product based on 
intellectual property—being exploited by large already-existing companies that 
did not respect patent rights. For MercExchange, eBay spent considerable time 
learning of Mr. Woolston’s business and patent filing history before making 
the decision to infringe Mr. Woolston’s patents.232 Similarly, for CSS, large 
ATM companies, like Diebold, learned of her Super ATM product capabilities 
years before introducing their own infringing ATM products. Accordingly, 
from the case studies, the only evidence of large actors using size or resources 
to their advantage is on the part of the large-company defendant patent 
infringers.233 
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2. Characteristics of PAEs Supporting a Horatio Alger Inventor Image 
PAEs transfer resources from consumer-commercializing activities to 
innovation. 
The facts concerning both case studies support this assertion. For all legal 
actions reviewed where resources transferred due to judgment or licensing 
settlement, the transfer was from an active consumer-commercializing entity to 
the initial technology innovator. While the consumer-commercializing entity 
might also be an innovation entity, the primary business was one of 
commercialization and not innovation.234 Further, looking at the post-litigation 
history of both Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin, both inventors have continued to 
develop new technology. Both inventors have been issued additional patents, 
and in the case of Mr. Woolston, he has expanded his subject areas of 
innovation far beyond anything MercExchange was initially founded to 
develop. 
PAEs stand for individual inventors who are not in the business of practicing 
inventions. 
The facts concerning both case studies weigh in favor of this assertion but 
the analysis is not perfectly clear. Both MercExchange and CSS were founded 
to design and develop commercial products. Both companies were also 
founded by inventors who had never owned or managed a company before. 
While both companies did originally plan to do more than simply own patents, 
as time went on, both entities eventually consisted of only the individual 
inventor and the patents. It is also worth noting that both companies had great 
difficulties with raising capital, communicating with larger existing business 
partners, and—on the part of MercExchange—internal company management. 
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Amongst other things, if the success of the patents within litigation can be 
considered a sign of innovative value, then that would most certainly be the 
greatest value added—certainly a greater value added than either entity 
practicing the inventions. In short, while the original entity intent and evolution 
does not make this a clear analysis, a conclusion that both Mr. Woolston and 
Ms. Gustin are primarily best at innovation can certainly be drawn. 
PAEs spawn innovation through creation of a licensing marketplace for 
inventions. 
The facts concerning both case studies weigh in favor of this assertion but 
the analysis is not perfectly clear. Both MercExchange and CSS have licensed 
their patents, and both entities have transferred resources from 
commercialization of an invention to the original inventor; however, it is 
unclear if there is any increased marketplace for licensing inventions or any 
growth in innovation broadly through invention licensing. The CSS litigation 
facts do draw the inference that once companies begin to license a patent, 
similar companies would be more willing to license; but this is certainly not a 
marketplace open to other invention licensing. There is no evidence of 
innovation outside MercExchange/Mr. Woolston or CSS/Ms. Gustin occurring 
as a result of the MercExchange and CSS litigation. 
PAEs bringing a lawsuit are likely to be the same entity that filed the patent 
application initially. 
The facts concerning both case studies support this assertion. The case 
studies make perfectly clear that the entities and individuals who originally 
filed the patent applications—MercExchange/Mr. Woolston and CSS/Ms. 
Gustin—are the entities and individuals bringing the patent assertion lawsuit. 
Individuals face a significant disadvantage in high stakes patent litigation 
unless they allow PAEs to enforce their patents. 
The facts concerning both case studies support this assertion. Regarding 
MercExchange, as the trial testimony of Mr. Woolston made clear, at the time 
MercExchange thought eBay was genuinely working to purchase 
MercExchange’s patents, “eBay was [in fact] trying to get a jump on [a] 
lawsuit.”235 After a few months of patent sale negotiations with eBay, it 
became MercExchange’s position that eBay was simply “looking for ways to 
kill the patents instead of buying them.”236 In the same way, when CSS sent 
letters asserting that certain companies were infringing their patents rights, 
those companies, as plaintiffs, filed declaratory judgment actions of non-
 
 235. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 595. 
 236. Wilkinson, supra note 94. 
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infringement instead of waiting to see if CSS would file a lawsuit. Further, as 
evidenced by the MercExchange v. eBay trial and appeals, all litigation options 
possible—including appeals to the Unites States Supreme Court—will 
potentially be waiting for anyone who attempts to assert patents. While legal 
freedoms to negotiate under any motivation, file a lawsuit preemptively, or 
appeal any judgment are certainly options, both case studies illustrate how 
individual patent owners could not possibly assert and litigate their own 
patents without an extensive legal team of support and a large amount of 
financial resources to cover the litigation costs. 
C. The Need for Further Empirical Research 
While the case studies described here support the Horatio Alger Inventor 
view of PAEs, this research is extremely limited. First, both case studies could 
be outliers of PAE circumstances—a larger sampling of PAE case studies is 
needed to draw formal final conclusions. Second, while the author has 
attempted to understand the PAE literature and compare the two case study 
facts to the most important PAE characteristics being discussed, there could be 
additional analysis points that these—and other—PAE case studies can be 
evaluated against. Third, additional analysis into any case study can always be 
conducted—for example, as discussed in Part IV.B.1, research into the patent 
prosecution history of the PAE patents may provide further insights into the 
business or litigation strategy of PAEs. 
CONCLUSION 
The case studies discussed here repudiate the common view of PAEs as 
patent trolls lurking beneath the bridge of innovation exacting tolls on the 
patent system and overall economy. To the contrary, the case study research 
here, while only a preliminary investigative step to provide a hypothesis, 
supports the countervailing view of PAEs representing the interests of “Horatio 
Alger Inventors” who tirelessly labor to build bridges of innovation and who 
seek only their fair share. Specifically, these two case studies illustrate that: 
1. Modern inventors see obtaining a patent covering their invention as the 
fundamental motivation to invent and the only protection possible to 
protect their business, share ideas, and raise capital. 
2. PAEs enforce patent rights against companies they originally sought 
business partnership relationships from long before the companies 
infringed their patents. 
3. PAEs represent the original inventors and patent applicants who 
initially intended to build and manage their own companies based on 
their inventions. Accordingly, PAEs transfer resources from consumer-
commercializing companies to original inventors. 
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4. PAEs assert inventions which were revolutionary at the time of 
conception but, for a variety of reasons, did not themselves become a 
commercially successful business enterprise. 
5. PAEs do not: seek to acquire patents that encompass existing 
technology; work to create a patent thicket; seek to delay patent 
issuance, asserting patents, licensing negotiations, or litigation. 
6. PAEs represent small companies that were ignored by large companies 
when business partnership and patent licensing offers were initially 
communicated. 
7. Individuals and small companies face a significant disadvantage in 
patent assertion pursuits unless they have extensive legal support and 
sufficient financial resources to cover litigation expenses.237 
These insights are at odds with most current “troll” and empirical research 
regarding PAEs. Accordingly, this Article counsels for further research and 
analysis regarding the individuals PAEs represent and the patented inventions 
asserted by PAEs. This broader research should be conducted before any 
sweeping changes to the patent system are considered. 
 
 
 237. For a reminder of the limitations on the applicability of these points, see supra Part II.A 
and note 82. 
